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Multilevel Approach to Sustainability Report Assurance
Decisions
Belen Fernandez-Feijoo, Department of Finance and Accounting, University of Vigo
Silvia Romero, Department of Accounting, Law and Taxation, Montclair State University
Silvia Ruiz, Department of Finance and Accounting, University of Vigo
Using generalised linear mixed models as a statistical tool, this paper analyses the factors that explain the
decision of a company to assure their sustainability report and of the choice of a Big 4 auditor as assuror.
Specifically, we investigate the variables that affect the two dependent variables, existence of assurance and
the profile of the assuror, at two different levels: the characteristics of the reporting company, and the country
in which the company is located. Previous literature has explained this relationship as the result of linear
regression models, considering only the fixed effects of the factors. Taking into account random effects, we are
able to arrive at more precise conclusions on the effect of country (legal tradition and European membership)
and company variables (size, public or non-public, industry and integrated reporting), on the existence of
assurance and the profile of the assuror.

ustainability reporting is a natural output of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Companies with
a CSR strategy should be willing to disclose their
social, economic and environmental performance (Hubbard 2009) given that it showcases their activities in the
area. Sustainability reports (SRs) are the best tool for
this communication. Because SRs include mostly voluntary disclosure, and there are only limited standards,
the inclusion of an assurance statement (AS) adds an
additional layer of credibility to the report and reduces
the information risk. As stated in previous research, the
existence of independent assurance is a mechanism of
quality, reliability and transparency (Bachoo et al. 2013;
Dubbink et al. 2008; Williams 2005). Although the external verification of SRs is not always as deep as it should
be (Gillet 2012), it improves the users’ perceptions of the
SR’s credibility (Hodge et al. 2009). Ball et al. (2000) posit
that SR assurance exhibits a ‘managerial turn’ rather than
a commitment to transparency. Deegan et al. (2006a,
2006b) find ambiguity in assurance reports in Europe
and Australia. They conclude that it has limited value.
Furthermore, O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) raise questions
on the independence of the assurers and the high degree
of management control in the assurance process.
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Different factors may explain why companies assure
their SRs. Some of these are linked to the characteristics of the country in which the company is located
(Kolk and Perego 2010; Simnett et al. 2009; Perego 2009)
and others are linked to companies’ specific incentives,
such as building their reputation or enhancing their SR
credibility (Francis et al. 2011; Simnett et al. 2009).
Research linking ASs and companies’ characteristics is
not conclusive.
Regarding the provider of assurance for SRs, major
accountancy firms assure 67% of the N100 companies
(KPMG 2013). It has been stated that financial accounting auditing inspires the SR assurance process and that
the existing gap in financial auditing between the Big 4
and others is also applicable to SR assurance (Deegan
et al. 2006; Boiral and Gendron 2011). Also, assurance
by Big 4 auditing firms is linked to higher quality AS
in format and procedures (Perego 2009), and Big 4 auditing firms produce more moderate assurance reports
than other assurers (Mock et al. 2007; Martinov-Bennie
and Hoffman 2012).
From an economic perspective, the demand for SR
assurance is justified as long as the benefits obtained in
terms of credibility are higher than the cost of the assurance service. In addition, the accounting profession has
an active role in the development of regulatory mechanisms linked to social responsibility practices (Hopwood
2009). The 2013 KPMG survey (KPMG 2013) indicates
that less than 60% of the largest 100 companies around
the world present assured information, which might
doi: 10.1111/auar.12104
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indicate that the cost of the assurance service is high
or that there is a perception that it does not add value to
the report.
Prior literature has studied the variables that affect
the existence of ASs at two different levels: the characteristics of the reporting company (Mock et al., 2013;
Kolk and Perego 2010; Zorio et al. 2013; Perego 2009;
Sierra-Garcı́a et al. 2013a) and the country in which
the company is located (Kolk and Perego 2010; Simnett
et al. 2009; Perego 2009). To the best of our knowledge,
previous research has considered the effects of country and company characteristics on the dependent variable without considering the existence of a structure of
nested data. This structure indicates the links among
companies that belong to the same country. If these
links are ignored, and classical regression is used, statistical and conceptual inconsistencies may arise (Hox
2002; Pardo and Ruiz 2012) because data will be analysed either aggregated (grouping by country) or disaggregated (using company as unit of analysis). In the
first case, the information related to companies is aggregated by countries and the statistical analysis loses
power due to the underlying reduction of the sample. In
the second case, the characteristics of the country and
the company are the explanatory variables, and the variability of the estimations associated with country could
be underestimated, finding associations that do not exist.
There may also be conceptual problems if data are analysed at one level and conclusions are drawn at another
level. Therefore, when data are nested or when there are
repeated measurements for one unit of observation, it
is recommended that multilevel modelling techniques
are used. These techniques improve the understanding
of the relationship between the explained and explanatory variables, because the interrelations among the latter are identified and statistically analysed. The use of
mixed models makes it possible to simultaneously assess
different layers of a nested dataset.
Our paper contributes to the literature by using a
multilevel statistic model. We investigate the factors that
explain the decision of a company to assure their SRs
(Model 1) and the choice of a Big 4 auditor as assurance
provider (Model 2). In order to define the two models to be tested, the candidate explanatory variables are
selected from prior literature. We then explore the bivariate associations among those identified variables to
select the explanatory variables to be included in our
regression. We apply generalised linear mixed models
in two steps, first to test the adequacy of this technique
and, second, to test our hypotheses. We use a large sample of 3706 reports from 22 countries over a three-year
period (2011–2013) from 2220 companies. By having
a more extensive sample than those found in previous
research, our results allow generalisation and expanded
analysis.
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Literature Review and Hypotheses
Development
Theoretical approach
Prior literature has identified several theories to support
CSR reporting. Among them, institutional, stakeholder
and legitimacy theories are the most widely argued in
CSR reporting (Hahn and Kühnen 2013).
Institutional theory emphasises the social context
within which firms operate. Bansal (2005) posits that
institutional theory is relevant to CSR for three reasons: (1) individual values and beliefs judge a firm’s
commitment to sustainable development, affecting perceptions of the firm’s acceptability and legitimacy; (2)
discussions among people with different opinions result
in common beliefs and norms; (3) sustainability issues
become institutionalised and regulated. The legal system has been used as an institutional factor to explain
the decision to assure the SR (Kolk and Perego 2010;
Simnett et al. 2009) and the choice of a Big 4 auditor
as assuror (Perego 2009; Simnett et al. 2009). Even if
the corporation has no marginal return from their sustainability practices, it might still decide to engage in
sustainability as a result of regulation or social pressure,
creating differences among countries produced by the
demand for sustainability. Hence, there is an effect at the
country level that needs to be considered when studying
sustainability.
Another explanation for why companies may engage in sustainability practices and assure their SRs is
linked to stakeholder and legitimacy theories. Freeman
(1984) posits that different factors such as stakeholders,
values and societal issues have to be analysed to establish the foundation of enterprise-level strategy. He indicates that the distinguishing feature of CSR is that it
applies ‘the stakeholder concept to non-traditional stakeholder groups usually thought as having an adversarial
relationship with the firm’, and that ‘less emphasis is
put on satisfying owners and comparatively more emphasis is put on the public or the community or the
employees’ (Freeman 1984: 38). Based on this idea, stakeholder pressure is expected to determine the assurance
of SRs and the selection of assuror. Previous literature
has stated that this pressure is associated with industry
membership and company size (Kolk and Perego 2010;
Mock et al. 2007; Sierra-Garcı́a et al. 2013a). For example, companies with activities that have a major environmental impact or companies that are well known to
the general public will try to reduce risks, giving more
confidence to their stakeholders through CSR-assured
information.
Legitimacy theory is based on the idea that there
is a ‘social contract’ between a company and the society in which it operates. This theory assumes that
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companies will behave in such a way that society
will recognise them as socially responsible (O’Donovan
2002). The disclosure of CSR information through SRs
legitimises the role of the firm within society (Deegan
2002), given that when society perceives that a company’s
behaviour is not acceptable, a legitimacy gap may develop (Branco and Rodrigues 2006). In those situations,
the existence of assurance reinforces social behaviour by
adding credibility to the report.
These two latest theories explain that differences in
reporting and assurance may exist depending on company characteristics and independently of the country in
which the company operates, making it important to take
into account this effect when researching sustainability.
In sum, both effects, at the country and company
levels, need to be identified; otherwise we may reach
erroneous conclusions.
Country-level determinants
Previous international research on country determinants
of SR assurances offer mixed results. Origin of laws, enforcement and institutional pressure are the determinants of legal system traditions most frequently cited
(Kolk and Perego 2010).
Regarding the origin of laws, Simnett et al. (2009) classify countries differentiating between common law (associated with shareholder-oriented countries) and code
law (related to stakeholder-oriented countries) (Ball et al.
2000). Simnett et al.’s (2009) results support that the
choice of an accounting firm as assuror is higher in
companies in stakeholder-oriented countries. Kolk and
Perego (2010) use a logistic regression with fixed effects to analyse the likelihood that a SR has been assured. Their sample includes 341 companies in 20 countries for the years 1999, 2002 and 2005, resulting in 636
observations. They find a positive association between
the response variable (existence of AS) and the stakeholder orientation of the country. They conclude that
country-level factors are significant drivers of sustainability assurance, and highlight the need for future research to analyse country-level and firm-level factors
concurrently. These researchers also analyse if the origin
of the law, besides the other aforementioned determinants, is significant in the choice of assurance provider.
For that purpose, they use the SRs in their sample that
were externally assured (98 SRs). They find no significant effect of country-level determinants on choice of
assurer.
The second determinant used in previous literature is
the enforcement mechanism (Simnett et al. 2009; Kolk
and Perego 2010). It is measured by the rule of law,
which was developed by the World Bank. The rule of
law is a measure of the ‘ . . . perceptions of the extent to
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
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society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence’ (Kaufman et al.
2010: 4). Simnett et al. (2009) use an international sample of 2113 companies that published SRs in the period
2002–2004. They find that companies in countries with
a strong legal system are more likely to have their SRs
assured. However, Kolk and Perego (2010) conclude that
companies in countries with weak enforcement mechanisms are more likely to assure their SRs.
Pressure for sustainability is the third determinant of a
country’s legal system tradition. Kolk and Perego (2010)
find a positive relationship between the existence of AS
and the pressure towards sustainability. However, they
cannot reach any conclusions on the effect of pressure
on choice of assurance provider. Finally, Perego (2009)
studies the choice of the assurance provider using a data
set collected between 1999 and 2005 from companies in
Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Ireland, Malaysia,
North America, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, the United Kingdom (UK) and other European
countries. At the country level, he uses different indexes
as proxies for the quality of governance and legal country
regime. He finds that the choice of a large accounting firm
as assuror of the SR is positively associated with countries
with weaker enforcement, and negatively associated with
the level of litigation risk in the country, measured by
a Liability Standard Index developed by LaPorta et al.
(2006).
We complete country determinants with a novel element not considered in previous research. In 2001, the
European Commission developed a strategic policy to
promote CSR. One of the main effects of this policy
is the rise of companies that prepare and present their
SRs according to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
framework, from 270 in 2006 to over 850 in 2011 (European Commission 2011). The preeminence of Europe in
the sustainability assurance market was highlighted by
Mock et al. (2007), and was evidenced by observations
of a sample of 130 companies that published assured SRs
in the 2002–2004 period. In a comparative study with
data from 2006–2007, Mock et al. (2013) confirmed the
leadership of European companies in sustainability assurance. As a consequence of institutional pressure from
the European Union (EU), on 15 April 2014, the European Parliament approved the Directive on disclosure of
non-financial and diversity information by certain large
companies and groups.1 European public policies promote the quality of sustainability disclosures but do not
set rules on the selection of assurance providers. Hence,
we hypothesise that countries in the EU are more likely
to have SRs externally assured, but we expect no effect
on the choice of assurer.
Based on our theoretical approach, our country-level
hypotheses are stated as follows:
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H1: Determinants at the country level (origin of the law,
enforcement and institutional pressure) affect the decision to have SRs externally assured.
H2: Determinants at the country level (origin of the law,
enforcement and institutional pressure) affect the decision to hire a Big 4 company as assurance provider.
H3: Being domiciled in an EU country affects the decision
of a company to have SRs externally assured.
H4: Being domiciled in an EU country does not affect the
decision of a company to hire a Big 4 company as
assurance provider.
Company-level determinants
As observed in previous literature, the decision to assure SRs and the choice of assurance provider can be
affected by industry membership, company size and
shareholder pressure. As for country determinants, previous research presents no conclusive results. Perego
(2009) tests company-level variables such as size, industry and profitability, and finds no conclusive results for
any of them. On the contrary, Kolk and Perego (2010)
show a significant association between existence of assurance and concrete industries: companies in oil, chemical
and manufacturing industries, and no significant association between existence of assurance, and the explanatory variables size and capitalisation rate. Sierra-Garcı́a
et al. (2013a) study the factors that influence the decision to have SRs externally assured, as well as the choice
of assurance provider, considering only firm-level variables. The sample includes 133 Ibex-35 Spanish companies with SRs, and the variables under consideration are
industry, size, profitability and leverage. They conclude
that the decision to externally assure a SR is positively
associated with size and ROE (return on equity), and
negatively associated with ROA (return on assets) and
leverage. The authors use a second sample of 163 companies issuing SRs (with and without AS), and find a
relationship between the financial audit market and the
SR assurance market. Finally, using a third sample of 135
companies with SRs and AS, they conclude that companies in the oil and energy, basic materials and financial
industries are more likely to have their SRs assured by
a Big 4 auditing firm. Zorio et al. (2013) find similar
results using a sample of 130 companies listed on the
Bolsa de Madrid in the period 2005–2010. The authors
highlight that big companies, those that belong to the
oil and energy industries, as well as companies listed on
IBEX-35, are more likely to have their SRs assured. They
also find that the decision to hire an auditor, as opposed
to a consultant, depends on industry, size and inclusion
on the IBEX-35.
Mock et al. (2007) use a sample of 130 assured SRs
from 21 countries during the years 2002–2004 and find
that companies in utilities, mining and oil are more likely
to assure their SRs than companies in other industries.
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This result is updated in Mock et al. (2013) who find that
companies in the tobacco, food and drinks industries are
starting to assure their SRs. They conclude that companies in economically sensitive industries have more AS
than their counterparts in other industries.
To date, the International Integrated Reporting
Committee (IIRC), which was created by the Prince’s
Accounting for Sustainability Project, the GRI and the
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), is
working on a framework to provide the wide range of
information that investors demand. According to the
IIRC, an integrated report should identify the financial
and non-financial connections among the following
elements (IIRC 2011): organisational overview and business model; operating context (risks and opportunities
included); strategic goals and strategies to achieve these
goals; governance and remuneration; performance; and
future outlook. Based on these initiatives we add two
additional determinants at the company level, which
are linked to company strategy in reporting. We expect
that the commitment to CSR, represented by higher
levels of CSR disclosure or by the assumption that
integrated reports provide enhanced communication
with stakeholders, will affect the existence of assurance
and the quality of the assurance provider.
There is little research on the determinants of integrated reports mainly focused on country-level determinants (Frı́as-Aceituno et al. 2013a; Garcı́a-Sánchez
et al. 2013; Jensen and Berg 2012; Sierra-Garcı́a et al.
2013b), but also including characteristics at the company level (Frı́as-Aceituno et al. 2013b; Sierra-Garcı́a
et al. 2013b). Sierra-Garcı́a et al. (2013b) find that the
likelihood of presenting an integrated report is significantly and positively associated with the assurance of
SRs.
Thus, based on the discussed theoretical approach,
our company-level hypotheses are stated as follows:
H5: Determinants at the company level (industry, size, GRI
application level and existence of integrated report)
affect the decision to have SRs externally assured.
H6: Determinants at the company level (industry, size, GRI
application level and existence of integrated report)
affect the decision to hire a Big 4 as assurance provider.
Research Method
Methodology
We test our hypotheses with two models. Model 1 is
used to test the hypotheses referring to the existence of
external assurance and Model 2 is used to test the set of
hypotheses referring to the choice of a Big 4 assuror.
We begin our analysis with a bivariate test of the explanatory variables selected from the literature review in
order to choose those with a statistical association with
Australian Accounting Review
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the response variables. When the variables are categorical, we use a cross-tabulation analysis; when the variables
are continuous, we calculate the correlations. We continue with the application of a generalised linear mixed
model in two steps: (1) the justification of the use of
this methodology with an unconditional or null model,
excluding the explanatory variables; (2) the test of the
hypotheses applying the following model:
Yi j = βoj + β1j X1ij + · · · +β nj Xnij + εij
Yij is assurance in Model 1 and Big 4 in Model 2. It is the
response variable referred to as the ith company in
the jth country.
X1ij , . . . , Xnij represent the n explanatory variables at the
company level.
εij represents the error or random variation around the
average.
Because in our sample this variable is dichotomous,
we express the model as a logistic regression, as follows:
Yij = log

Pr(Yij = 1)
Pr(Yij = 0)

The parameters βoj , β1j , . . . βnj are not constants as in
a classical regression, but are variables with values that
may change from one country to another. For example,
β0j includes three components:
(1) A fixed component (γ 00 ) that represents the global
average of the dependent variable.
(2) A second component representing the explanatory
variables at the country level (Z1 , . . . Zm ).
(3) A random component (U0j , . . . , Unj ) that represents
the variability of the means of the dependent variables in the different countries with respect to the
global variability.
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Z 1j + · · · + γ0m Z mj + U0j
β1j = γ10 + γ11 Z 1j + · · · + γ1m Z mj + U1j
βnj = γn0 + γn1 Z 1j + · · · + γnm Z mj + Unj
The model establishes a hierarchy in the data. In our
sample, company-year (level 1) is nested in countries
(level 2); hence, data at the company-year level are not
independent within each country given their common
country characteristics.
Sample
Data were collected from the GRI website. The GRI does
not require reported information to have any kind of
assurance. Registrants may choose to add an AS to en350
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hance the credibility of the report, achieving a plus rating. We used this dataset because the GRI is recognised as
the most trusted framework for CSR reporting (KPMG
2011; Brown et al. 2009; Kaye 2011). In the period 2011–
2013 this dataset included 8332 companies with SR registered in more than 80 countries. Sample 1 is used to
test the hypotheses referring to the existence of external
assurance represented in Model 1. It consists of 3706
company-year observations, from 2220 companies that
voluntarily decided to register their SRs according to
the GRI. In order to achieve a worldwide representation
of countries with and without mandatory CSR reporting, and in developed and developing economies, our
sample includes 22 countries in different regions. For
companies in each of these countries, we removed all
the SRs that did not follow the GRI guidelines or the SR
classified as GRI content index, to eliminate the effect of
information that is not homogeneous. Duplications were
excluded and data completed with hand-collected information from the corporate websites, as needed. Sample
2 derives from Sample 1, and it is used to test the set of
hypotheses referring to the choice of a Big 4 company as
assuror, represented in Model 2. Thus, this second sample includes only the assured SRs, resulting in a total of
1491 observations from 874 companies.
Variable definition
In Model 1, the response variable is Assurance. This variable adopts a value of 1 if the company has its SR externally assured, and 0 otherwise. Big4 is the response
variable in Model 2. Big4 adopts a value of 1 if the SR is
assured by a Big 4 firm, and 0 otherwise.
The explanatory variables are as follows:
(a) At the country level
Country is a nominal variable, representing the 22
countries in the sample. We use this variable as a grouping factor (random effect).
NCRI (National Corporate Responsibility Index) is
used as a proxy for institutional pressure towards sustainability (Kolk and Perego 2010) and calculated by Zadek
et al. (2005). NCRI refers to three dimensions: internal
(corporate governance, ethical practices and human capital development); external (civil society context); and
environmental management.
RuleofLaw is a measure of regulatory enforcement developed by The World Bank Group (2013). We used the
last available information, that from 2012.
LawOrigin is defined according to Djankov et al.
(2008). It has a value of 1 for common law and 0 for
civil or code law.
EU identifies companies in European Union countries. It has a value of 1 if countries are in the EU, and 0
otherwise.
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b) At the company level:
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Table 1 Sample distribution by country
Sample 1

Industry, refers to the sector of the company issuing the
SR. The GRI database classifies 38 industries. We group
them into 10 values according to their nature using previous classifications (Amran and Haniffa 2010; Deegan
and Gordon 1996; Wilmshurst and Frost 2000). Energy
and chemicals (chemicals, energy, energy utilities); construction (construction, construction materials); consumer goods (consumer durables, food and beverages,
healthcare products, household and personal products,
retailers); transportation (aviation, logistic, railroad); finance (financial services); primary sector (agriculture,
forest and paper, mining); manufacturing (automotive,
equipment, metal products, textiles apparel, tobacco,
toys); services (commercial services, healthcare services,
media, non-profit services, public agency, real estate,
tourism/leisure, universities, waste management, water
utilities); technology (computers, technology hardware,
telecommunications); and other (conglomerate, other).
Size has a value of 1 if the SR is published by a large or
multinational company, and 0 if the company is small or
medium, following the GRI criteria.
Listed has a value of 1 if the SR is issued by a company
publicly traded, and 0 otherwise.
App-level indicates the level of application of the GRI
guidelines. Two guidelines (G3 and G4) were issued by
the GRI in the period of analysis. From the sample of
3706 companies, 99.7% followed the G3 guidelines. G3
distinguishes three levels (A, B and C) from higher to
lower, which indicate the level of information disclosure
in the report. The remaining 0.3% is prepared according
to the G4 guidelines that establish two levels of disclosure (In Accordance-comprehensive and In Accordancecore). The GRI defines no association between G3 and
G4 guidelines. This variable adopts a value of 1 if the
SR has level A or In accordance-comprehensive, and 0
otherwise.
Integrated indicates how sustainability information is
disclosed by the company. This variable has a value of
1 if the company issues an integrated report and 0 if it
issues a stand-alone report. According to Sierra-Garcı́a
et al. (2013b), there is a positive association between the
decision to assure the SR and the likelihood of issuing an
integrated report.
Year is the variable that identifies the year of the
observation.
Results
Descriptive analysis
The distribution of the sample by country is shown
in Table 1. Sample 1 consists of 3706 reports from
22 countries, for the period 2011–2013. The United
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Sample 2

Country

Freq.

%

Freq.

%

Proportion of
SRs with AS

Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
China
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
UK
US
Total

96
159
60
274
207
242
47
151
72
231
76
51
135
55
196
34
66
159
342
299
166
588
3706

2.6
4.3
1.6
7.4
5.6
6.5
1.3
4.1
1.9
6.2
2.1
1.4
3.6
1.5
5.3
0.9
1.8
4.3
9.2
8.1
4.5
15.9
100

20
85
14
105
67
58
25
58
35
103
37
13
92
19
94
17
41
66
189
175
73
105
1491

1.3
5.7
0.9
7
4.5
3.9
1.7
3.9
2.3
6.9
2.5
0.9
6.2
1.3
6.3
1.1
2.7
4.4
12.7
11.7
4.9
7
100

20.83
53.46
23.33
38.32
32.37
23.97
53.19
38.41
48.61
44.59
48.68
25.49
68.15
34.55
47.96
50.00
62.12
41.51
55.26
58.53
43.98
17.86
40.23

Table 2 Sample distribution by industry
Sample 1
Industry

Freq.

%

Sample 2
Freq.

%

Proportion of
SRs with AS

Construction
184
4.96
73
4.90
Consumer goods
468 12.63 133
8.92
Transportation
182
4.10
86
5.77
Energy and chemicals 557 15.03 276 18.51
Primary sector
277
7.47 107
7.18
Manufacturing
262
7.07
92
6.17
Services
659 17.78 218 14.62
Technology
230
6.21
98
6.57
Other
418 11.28 160 10.73
Finance
469 12.66 248 16.63
Total
3706 100.00 1491 100.00

39.67
28.42
47.25
49.55
38.63
35.11
33.08
42.61
38.28
52.88
40.23

States (US) has the largest number of SRs representing
15.9% of the total. Norway, with 34 observations,
is the country with the least SRs (0.9%). Sample 2
consists of 1491 assured reports, with Spain and Sweden
being the countries with the highest number. The last
column in Table 1 reports the proportion of assured
SRs per country. Italy (68.15%), Portugal (62.12%),
Sweden (58.53%) and Spain (55.26%) have the highest
proportion of assured reports.
Table 2 presents the distribution by industry for the
two samples. The weights of ‘Services’, ‘Finance’, and
‘Energy and chemicals’ stand out in both samples. The
last column represents the proportion of assured SRs per
industry. Of the SRs in ‘Finance’, 52.88% are assured, in
contrast to 28.42% of SRs in ‘Consumer goods’.
Australian Accounting Review
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Table 3 Correlation/Cross tabulation analysis
Model 1
(Assurance) (N = 3706)
Factor

Pearson correlation

RuleofLaw
NCRI

.048
.054

LawOrigin
EU
Country
Size
Listed
Industry
App-level
Integrated

Model 2
(Big4) (N = 1491)

Asym. Sig (2-tales)

Pearson correlation

.003
.001

Asym. Sig (2-tales)

.143
.152

.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square

Asym. Sig (2-tales)

Pearson Chi-Square

Asym. Sig (2-tales)

69.801
164.229
341.436
21.941
17.893
100.597
558.643
15.659

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

51.862
81.008
284.679
3.565
10.571
52.626
.605
6.373

.000
.000
.000
.059
.001
.000
.437
.012

In Sample 1, 87.2% of the reports are from large
or multinational companies, 57.3% are issued by listed
companies and 40.2% have an AS. In Sample 2, 90.3%
of the reports are issued by large or multinational companies, 61.4% are from listed companies and 64% are
assured by a Big 4 auditing firm.

not the same in all countries (p-value of Z statistics is less
than 0.005 in all cases). Table 5 presents the covariance
parameters for Sample 2. Variance among countries is
0.986; and intraclass coefficients are around 0.50, which
shows that a half of the total variability of the dependent
is due to the fact that companies are grouped into
countries, justifying the use of the multilevel approach.

Bivariate analysis
Test of hypotheses
Results of the correlation analysis for continuous variables (Rule of law and NCRI) and cross-tabulation for
categorical variables (Law origin, EU, Country, Size,
Listed, Industry, Application level and Integrated reports) are presented in Table 3 (significant at the 010%
level). All factors have statistical association with the
response variable ‘Existence of assurance’ (Model 1).
Regarding the variable response ‘Choice of a Big4’
(Model 2), all factors, except for ‘Application level’ are
significant.
Test of multilevel structure
We apply the unconditional or null model to Sample 1 to
measure the effect of the factor ‘Country’ on dependent
variable ‘Assurance’, excluding the explanatory variables.
The model fits 64.2%. Z statistics showing the effect of
country are significant for all years (p-value is less than
0.005). Hence, the average likelihood of presenting assurance of SRs by companies is not the same in all the
countries for each of the three years. As shown in Table 4,
variance among the countries is 0.345; intraclass coefficients in different years are around 0.25, which means
that a quarter of the total variability of the dependent
variable is due to the fact that companies are grouped into
countries, justifying the use of the multilevel approach.
The same procedure is repeated with Sample 2. The
accuracy of the model is 71%. Results show that the
average likelihood of choosing a Big 4 firm as assuror is
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Model 1 (Existence of external assurance)
We run a generalised linear mixed model with a binomial probability distribution and a logit link function
over two levels: country and company-year. Country is
used as random effect and the variables with significant
correlations in the bivariate analysis determine the fixed
effects. The test of Model 1 has a good fit (72.6%).
Table 6 shows the estimated values of the parameters
associated with the random effects and the intraclass coefficients. A comparison of the intraclass coefficients of
Model 1 with the corresponding unconditional model
shows a slight reduction, which means that the explanatory variables introduced in Model 1 explain part of
the variability among countries. The estimated value of
the covariance parameters in Model 1 is 0.219, less than
the corresponding value in the unconditional model
(0.345). This means that 36.5% ((0.345–0.219)/0.345) of
the variability among countries is explained by the variables at the country level introduced in Model 1. The Z
test is significant at the 0.05 level. This result shows that
there are other determinants in the decision to present
an AS at the country level that are not included in our
model and which have to be investigated.
Fixed effects are shown in Table 7. Our results do not
support Hypothesis 1 because legal system (LawOrigin),
enforcement (RuleofLaw) and pressure towards Sustainability (NCRI) do not have a significant effect on the
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Table 4 Covariance parameters with null or unconditional model on Sample 1
Var.
Subject: country
Residual (2011)
Residual (2012)
Residual (2013)

Estimate

Z

Sig.

.345
.925
1.021
1.099

2.922
28.286
23.900
21.173

.003
.000
.000
.000

Year
2011
2012
2013

Intraclass coefficients
.345/(.345 + .925) = .2717
.345/(.345 + 1.021) = .2526
.345/(.345 + 1.099) = .2389

Covariance structure: Variance components.

Table 5 Covariance parameters with null or unconditional model on Sample 2
Var.
Subject: country
Residual (2011)
Residual (2012)
Residual (2013)

Estimate

Z

Sig.

.986
.981
.986
.957

16.780
15.518
14.492
2.873

.004
.000
.000
.000

Year
2011
2012
2013

Intraclass coefficients
.986/(.986 + .981) = .5013
.986/(.986 + .988) = .5000
.986/(.986 + .957) = .5075

Covariance structure: Variance components.

Table 6 Model 1 Covariance parameters
Var.
Subject: country
Residual (2011)
Residual (2012)
Residual (2013)

Estimate

Z

Sig.

.219
.908
1.065
1.150

2.542
28.222
23.844
21.143

.011
.000
.000
.000

Year
2011
2012
2013

Intraclass coefficients
.219/(.219 + .908) = .1943
.219(.219 + 1.065) = .1706
.219/(.219 + 1.150) = .1600

Covariance structure: Variance components.

Table 7 Model 1: Fixed effects
Source
Correctedmodel
RuleLaw
NCRI
LawOrigin
EU

Table 8 Model 1: Fixed coefficients

F

Sig.

Source

29.738
.821
1.063
.000
5.407

.000
.365
.303
.990
.020

Size
Listed
Industry
App-level
Integrated

F

Sig.

Source

15.475
10.183
5.870
365.446
.006

.000
.001
.000
.000
.938

Intercept
EU countries = No
EU countries = Yes
Size = SME
Size = Large and multinational
Listed = No
Listed = Yes
Industry = Construction
Industry = Consumer goods
Industry = Transportation
Industry = Energy and chemical
Industry = Primary sector
Industry = Manufacturing
Industry = Services
Industry = Technology
Industry = Other
Industry = Finance
AppLevel = Other
AppLevel = Highest

response variable (Assurance). The EU variable is significant, which can be explained by the specific public
policies on CSR promoted by the European Commission. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported. At the companyyear level we observe that ‘Industry’, ‘Size’, ‘Listed’ and
‘App-level’ determine the existence of assurance of the
SRs. On the contrary, the existence of integrated reports
is not a significant factor. Hypothesis 5 is thus partially
supported.
Table 8 shows the exponential coefficients of the significant fixed effects. The results are as follows:
r The odds for companies in non-European countries
having their SRs externally assured are .509 times the
odds for European companies, all other things being
equal.
r In SME companies, the odds are .602 times the corresponding odds for large and multinational enterprises, all other things being equal.
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a This

Coefficient

Sig.

Exp (Coeff)

–.893
–.676
.000a
–.508
.000a
–.281
.000a
–.865
–.789
–.263
–.147
–.619
–.761
–.649
–.394
–.477
.000a
–1.825
.000a

.698
.020

.409
.509

.000

.602

.001

.755

.000
.000
.198
.315
.001
.000
.000
.036
.002

.421
.454
.769
.864
.538
.467
.523
.675
.620

.000

.161

coefficient is set to zero because it is redundant.

r In non-listed companies, the odds are .755 times the
corresponding odds for listed companies, all other
things being equal.
r For Industry, we reference companies in the financial
industry because it is the industry with the highest
rate of assured SRs. We find that, all other things
being equal:
Australian Accounting Review
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Table 9 Model 2: Covariance parameters
Var.
Subject: country
Residual (2011)
Residual (2012)
Residual (2013)

Estimate

Z

Sig.

.891
.998
1.017
1.047

2.512
16.696
15.418
14.381

.012
.000
.000
.000

the odds of having SRs externally assured in companies belonging to the construction industry are .421
times the corresponding odds for companies in the
Financial sector; in Consumer goods they are .454
times; in the Primary sector they are .538 times; in
Manufacturing they are .467 times; in Services they
are .523 times; in Technology they are .675 times;
and in Others they are .620 times.
the odds of having SRs externally assured in companies
that issue SR with the lowest levels of disclosure are
0.161 times the corresponding odds for companies
that issue the SR with the highest levels, all other
things being equal.
In sum, according to the GRI, the likelihood of having
SRs assured is higher in companies that are from Europe,
large or multinational, listed, or that present the SR with
the highest level of sustainability disclosure. We also find
that companies in Finance are more likely to have their
SRs externally assured than companies in Construction,
Consumer goods, Primary sector, Manufacturing, Services, Technology and Other. We find no evidence for
Transportation, and Energy and chemicals, indicating
that these sectors have no significant differences from
Finance.
Model 2 (Choice of a Big 4 as assuror)
The second model analyses the choice of a Big 4 firm
as provider of the SR assurance. Like Model 1, Model
2 is a generalised linear mixed model with a binomial
probability distribution and logit link function. Data are
nested within two levels, Country and Company-year.
Country is used as a random effect as in the previous
model. Model 2 has an appropriate goodness of fit test
(74.4%). The estimations of the parameters associated
with the random effects and the intraclass coefficients
are included in Table 9. The comparison of the estimated
value of covariance parameters of Model 2 (.891) with
the corresponding unconditional model (.986) shows a
slight reduction of 9%. After accounting for the explanatory variables, the differences among countries explain
47.17% of the variability of the response variable, Big4.
‘Intraclass coefficients’ has similar percentages in 2012
and 2013, 46.70% and 45.98% respectively. The likelihood of having SRs assured by a Big 4 firm is not the
same in all countries (p-value of Z test is .012).
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Year
2011
2012
2013

Intraclass coefficients
.891/(.891 + .998) = .4717
.891/(.891 + .1.017) = .4670
.891/(.891 + .1.047) = .4598

Table 10 Model 2: Fixed effects
Source
Corrected model
RuleLaw
NCRI
LawOrigin
EU

F

Sig.

Source

6.027
.033
.067
1.706
1.323

.000
.856
.796
.192
.250

Size
Listed
Industry
Integrated

F

Sig.

5.740
28.297
4.751
4.688

.017
.000
.000
.031

Table 11 Model 2: Fixed coefficients
Source
Intercept
Size = SME
Size = large and multinationals
Listed = No
Listed = Yes
Industry = Construction
Industry = Consumer goods
Industry = Transportation
Industry = Energy and chemical
Industry = Primary sector
Industry = Manufacturing
Industry = Services
Industry = Technology
Industry = Others
Industry = Finance
Integrated = No
Integrated = Yes
a This

Coefficient

Sig.

Exp (Coeff)

–.354
–.559
.000a
–.774
.000a
–.685
–1.128
.057
–.359
–.697
–1.103
–1.139
–.571
–.706
.000a
–.360
.000a

.931
.017

1.425
.572

.000

.461

.033
.000
.869
.108
.015
.000
.000
.060
.006

.504
.324
1.058
.698
.498
.332
.320
.565
.494

.031

.698

coefficient is set to zero because it is redundant.

Table 10 presents the explanatory variables of this
model: Size, Listed, Industry and Existence of an integrated report, all at the company level and included in
Hypothesis 6. Like Model 1, legal system (LawOrigin),
enforcement (RuleofLaw) or pressure to be sustainable
(NCRI) do not have a significant effect on the decision
to have the SR assured by a Big 4 firm. Finally, EU membership does not affect the dependent variable. Hence,
Hypothesis 2 is not supported, while Hypothesis 3 is
supported. These results suggest the possible existence
of other effects at country level that explain the selection
of a Big 4 firm as assuror. At the company level, ‘Size’,
‘Industry’, ‘Listed and presenting an integrated report’
are significant determinants for the choice of a Big 4 auditor. On the contrary, the GRI application level is not
significant. Hypothesis 6 then is partially supported.
Table 11 presents the exponential coefficients of the
significant fixed effects. The results are as follows:
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Table 12 Summary of the results
Hypothesis

Determinant

Result

Conclusion

Country level

H1

Origin of the law
Rule of law
NCRI
Origin of the law
Rule of law
NCRI
Belonging to the EU
Belonging to the EU
Industry
Size
Listed
GRI application level
Integrated reporting
Industry
Size
Listed
GRI application level
Integrated reporting

Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Not confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Not confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Not confirmed
Confirmed

H2

Company level

H3
H4
H4

H5

r The odds of having the SR externally assured by a Big
4 firm by small and medium size companies are .572
times the corresponding odds for large and multinational firms, all other thing being equal.
r The odds of having the SR externally assured by a
Big 4 firm in unlisted companies are .461 times the
corresponding odds for listed ones, all other things
being equal.
r For the variable ‘Industry’, we reference companies in
the financial industry. We find that, all other things
being equal:
-

-

in Construction the odds are .504 times
the corresponding odds for companies in
Finance;
in Consumer goods the odds are .324 times;
in Primary sector they are .498 times;
in Manufacturing they are .332 times;
in Services they are .320 times;
in Others they are .494 times.

r In companies that present sustainability information
in a stand-alone report, the odds are .698 times the
corresponding odds for companies that present it in
an integrated report.
Our results show that the likelihood of hiring a Big 4
auditing firm as SR assuror is higher in companies that
are large or multinational, listed and present sustainability information in an integrated report. Regarding
industry, the likelihood of choosing a Big 4 firm as assurance provider is higher in Finance than in Construction, Consumer goods, Primary sector, Manufacturing,
Services and Others.
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Rejected

Rejected

Accepted
Accepted
Partially accepted

Partially accepted

Discussion and Conclusions
The aim of our paper was to investigate the factors
that explain a company’s decision to assure their SRs
and their choice of assuror. We contribute to the existing literature by using generalised mixed models, which
consider the effect of randomness produced by hierarchical grouping. We used a large sample, which facilitates the generalisation of the results. In our paper, data
were analysed at two levels: country and company-year.
We tested the hypotheses using two samples. Sample
1 included 3706 company-year observations from 2220
companies in 22 countries. Sample 2 included only the
assured SRs of Sample 1, resulting in a total of 1491
observations from 874 companies, also in 22 countries.
We found that the decision to assure the SRs and the
choice of a Big 4 firm as assuror are explained both by
differences among countries and differences within each
country.
Regarding country level, in contrast to Kolk and
Perego (2010), Perego (2009) and Simnett et al. (2009),
we did not find that the legal system of the country,
measured by the origin of the law, legal enforcement
and pressure towards sustainability, significantly affects
the decision to externally assure SRs or the choice of a
Big 4 firm as assuror. Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 could
not be supported (Table 12). Also, at the country level,
we found that companies in the EU are more likely to
have their SRs assured than companies in non-EU countries, although they do not hire more Big 4 auditors
than companies in other countries. Our results therefore support Hypotheses 3 and 4. These results can be
explained by the existence of specific policies for sustainability in the EU that promote the assurance of
the SR as a tool to improve its quality, but do not put
Australian Accounting Review
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restrictions on the selection of assuror. This shows that
EU policy, via recommendations, exerts a pressure that
is influencing the behaviour of companies towards SR
assurance. These results are also explained by institutional theory. Regulation in general, and specifically regulation on CSR reporting, determines the institutional
structures, playing an important role in the development of CSR. As there is still an important proportion
of variability of both the two dependent variables analysed (decision to assure and the choice of a Big 4 auditor
as assurance provider) to be explained, new explanatory variables at the country level have to be explored.
Further research is needed to study determinants of SR
assurances at the country level, which might be related
to regulation.
At the company level, similar to Simnett et al. (2009)
and Sierra-Garcı́a et al. (2013a) we found that large and
multinational companies are more likely to have their
SR externally assured. We also found that the likelihood
of hiring a Big 4 firm as assurance provider is higher in
large companies than in small and medium ones, which
confirms the results from Simnett (2009), despite using
different measures. Comparable to Mock et al. (2007,
2013) and Kolk and Perego (2010), we found that companies in Energy and Chemicals are more likely to have
their SR assured. We also found that the odds of having
SRs assured are higher in Finance and Transportation.
Furthermore, as in Sierra-Garcı́a et al. (2013a) and Kolk
and Perego (2010), our results show that the likelihood
of choosing a Big 4 firm as assurance provider is higher in
Finance than it is in the Construction and Primary sectors, and for Consumer goods, Manufacturing, Services
and Others. In conclusion, company characteristics such
as size, public or non-public, and industry affect both the
decision to assure the SR and the choice of a Big 4 firm
as assuror. This would be related to the idea that large
firms and those belonging to sectors with greater visibility (stakeholder theory), such as financial services, have
a greater need to demonstrate that they are socially responsible and legitimise their role in society (legitimacy
theory). The level of application of the GRI guidelines is
found to be a measure of commitment to transparency,
because it affects the decision to have the SR assured,
but not the choice of assurance provider. Unlike SierraGarcı́a et al. (2013a), we did not find evidence that the
likelihood of presenting an integrated report is significantly and positively associated with having the SR assured. However, companies that present their SRs in an
integrated way are more likely to hire a Big 4 company
as assuror than companies that issue a non-integrated
report. This result might indicate that the issuance of an
integrated report drives managers to extend the criteria
used to choose the financial auditor to the choice of the
social reporting assuror. It is interesting that the current
trend for preparing integrated reports seems to promote
the hiring of a Big 4 firm as assurance provider.
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In conclusion, regulatory actions, such as those proposed by the EU Commission, have a greater effect on
the likelihood of having SRs assured than the legal system tradition of a country. Considering this effect, at
the company level, variables such as industry, size or
public/non-public ownership structure have been tested
in prior literature and our results reaffirm their influence on the probability of externally assuring SRs. Other
findings, such as the positive effect of the level of commitment to CSR by the reporting company on the presence of external assurance, contribute to the existing
literature by providing evidence relating to this matter.
Regarding the choice of a Big 4 auditor as assuror, we find
no country-level influence. This is an interesting result
if we consider that large accounting firms are involved in
the production of disclosure standards and information
assurance mechanisms (Malsch 2013). At the company
level, our results are consistent with previous works in
the literature: size, industry and public/non-public ownership structure influence the choice of a Big 4 firm as
assuror. We contribute to the existing literature by providing further evidence of the relationship between that
choice and the existence of an integrated report. Our
results highlight the country effect on both the decision
to assure the SR and the choice of a Big 4 company as
assuror.
One limitation of the present study is that our findings
can only be generalised to the population from which
the sample was obtained, that is, companies that register their SRs according to the GRI; therefore, they cannot be extrapolated to the whole sustainability assurance
market. Future research is needed to evaluate the determinants of assuring SR, including more countries and
different reporting frameworks. Another limitation is
the use of the GRI’s classification to determine the size
of the companies, which discriminates only among small
and medium, large and multinational without specifying
how it is calculated. A third limitation is the use of data
from 2011 to 2013, which may be biased due to different
crisis effects in the countries analysed. However, despite
these limitations, our results may be useful to regulators and companies that offer the assurance of the SR’s
service.
Note
1 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-301_en.htm
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